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Abstract In this paper I argue that the use of social nudges, policy interventions to
induce voluntary cooperation in social dilemma situations, can be defended against
two ethical objections which I call objections from coherence and autonomy. Specif-
ically I argue that the kind of preference change caused by social nudges is not
a threat to agents’ coherent preference structure, and that there is a way in which
social nudges influence behavior while respecting agents’ capacity to reason. I base
my arguments on two mechanistic explanations of social nudges; the expectation-
based and frame-based accounts. As a concrete example of social nudges I choose
the “Don’t Mess With Texas” anti-littering campaign and discuss in some detail how
it worked.
1 Introduction
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) popularized libertarian paternalism, the idea that behav-
ioral economics and psychology—“the emerging science of choice” (p. 7)—provides
policy makers with new tools to influence people’s economic and other choices for
their own benefit without compromising their freedom of choice. Similar ideas have
been proposed under different banners, such as ‘asymmetric’ (Camerer et al. 2003)
and ‘light’ (Loewenstein and Haisley 2008) paternalism. I call these ideas collectively
nudge paternalism. Its core idea is the use of nudges. Nudges are subtle behavioral
interventions that are distinct from standard regulations that operate with incentives.
Although nudges have already been applied as behavioral public policy in a wide
range of domains (Shafir 2013), nudge paternalism has attracted ethical and moral
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criticisms (e.g. Bovens 2009, Sugden 2009, Hausman andWelch 2010, Gru¨ne-Yanoff
2012). These critics, as well as the proponents of nudge paternalism, have not so
far paid sufficient attention to (i) the different types of psychological and social
processes exploited in paternalistic interventions and (ii) the implications of such dif-
ferences for the normative evaluation of these interventions (but see Gru¨ne-Yanoff
2014). Specifically, existing discussions of mechanisms of nudges tend to focus
on individual psychological mechanisms rather than collective and interactive
mechanisms, and on agents’ preferences rather than expectations when discussing
psychological mechanisms (e.g. Loewenstein and Haisley 2008, Heilmann 2014).
The goals of this paper are thus first to broaden the theoretical framework used
to describe mechanisms underlying nudges along these dimensions, and then explore
some normative implications of this extended framework. Specifically, I will focus
on social nudges that aim at increasing people’s voluntary provision of public goods.
Social nudges are an ideal case for my purposes because this type of nudge exploits
both individual and collective mechanisms that do not figure in more famous exam-
ples of nudges. To set the stage I will begin by clarifying normative issues before
discussing how social nudges work. First I will characterize paternalism in general,
and nudge paternalism in particular, explaining what is distinct about the criticisms
of the latter. I will identify two objections, the objection from autonomy and the
objection from coherence. I shall argue that the use of social nudges can be justified
against both objections, but for different reasons.
2 Normative Critiques of Nudge Paternalism
What is paternalism? As Dworkin (2013) notes, the answer to this conceptual-
normative question depends on the context and goal of analysis. Our context is that
in which the moral acceptability of a new form of paternalism, nudge paternalism,
is in question; and our goal is to set a framework in which different positions in
this debate can be sorted. To do this I propose the following definition: first of all,
paternalism is predicated on some form of interference on someone’s decision mak-
ing. How “active” interference should be to count as paternalistic is debatable. A
wide view is that all decisions are situated in particular contexts, and therefore any
change of contexts counts as interference. In contrast a narrow view requires more
direct forms of interference. For our purposes the wide view is more appropriate,
and indeed it seems to be the one adopted by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). Second,
we can distinguish the means and ends of interference. The goal of the paternal-
izer (call her X) is beneficence, namely to make the paternalizee (call him Y) better
off in some sense, e.g. financially, psychologically, or physically. The means is not
specified by the notion of paternalism per se (Dworkin 2013, fn. 25), although it is
typically the case that the measures used to benefit Y exploit some asymmetric rela-
tion between X and Y, e.g., X having more resources, knowledge, power, deliberative
skills, etc., than Y does (thus we do not talk about children acting paternalistically
towards their parents, or citizens towards their state). This focus on means and ends
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helps us to see that some debates concern whether the goal of paternalism itself is jus-
tified, while others concern whether the means are justified, independently from the
goal.
The issue of whether the goal (beneficence) is justified pertains not only to nudge
paternalism but to paternalism in general. For this reason I shall not discuss it
here (see Sugden 2009, Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2012). Another distinct critique against nudge
paternalism concerns nudges as a specific means of paternalism. Thaler and Sunstein
(2008, 6) characterize a nudge as follows:
A nudge, as we will use the term, is any aspect of the choice architecture [i.e.,
the context in which people make decisions] that alters people’s behavior in a
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their
economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy
and cheap to avoid.
This negative characterization of a nudge is intended to highlight its appealing fea-
ture that it does not significantly limit the individual freedom of choice. To use
the famous examples from Thaler and Sunstein (2008), it is supposed to be easy
and cheap to avoid healthy food in a cafeteria, or opt out from a contribution plan
for retirement saving. And yet the choice architect (X) can increase the likelihood
of Y’s choosing healthy food or wise saving plan simply by changing subtle fea-
tures of the choice architecture. Let us suppose for the moment that in each case
X’s goal of beneficence is uncontroversial (so imagine that Y will be better off
“nudged”). A number of philosophers argue that these types of nudges may still
diminish liberty in a wider sense than the freedom of choice, namely through interfer-
ence with one’s self-governance or autonomy—‘the control an individual has over his
or her own evaluations and choices’ (Hausman and Welch 2010, 128). Such nudges,
philosophers complain,
‘deliberately circumvent people’s rational reasoning and deliberating faculties,
and instead seek to influence their choices through knowledge of the biases to
which they are susceptible’ (Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2012, 636 )
exploit ‘flaws in human decision-making to get individuals to choose one
alternative rather than another’ (Hausman and Welch 2010, 128)
Since these quotes seem to rely on different intuitions about why nudges are
autonomy-damaging, it is useful to explicitly distinguish relevant notions of auton-
omy here (for a thorough review of alternative notions of autonomy see Buss 2014,
Section 2). First, terms like “flaws” and “biases” assume some rational ideal of choice
behavior from which individuals deviate. In economics this ideal is modeled as cer-
tain consistency conditions in choice, such as transitivity of preferences. This is an
instance of the general notion of autonomous agency as the capacity to base actions
on internally coherent mental states (the coherentist view). On this view, nudges
are autonomy-damaging when they cause inconsistent preferences or more generally
incoherent mental states. Call this the objection from coherence. Second, verbs such
as “circumvent”, “influence”, and “get individuals to choose” suggest a violation of
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autonomy in terms of reasoning processes. The underlying intuition corresponds to
the notion of autonomous agency as the capacity to reason and respond to reasons
(Buss 2014).1 Nudges, according to this intuition, are morally unacceptable when
they induce behavioral changes to which one’s reasoning process is not responsive.
Call this the objection from autonomous reasoning or autonomy for short.
In what follows I will examine both objections in turn, and show that there
are plausible mechanisms through which social nudges work that is not autonomy-
damaging in the senses explicated in both objections.
3 The Objection from Coherence
In the rational choice tradition, the concept of autonomy has been discussed in terms
of the rationality of preference change because, in this tradition, behavioral change is
theoretically closely tied to change in preference. The crucial question thus becomes
whether a particular preference change is rational in some specified sense. In criti-
cizing Elster’s (1983) theory of rational preference change qua intentional preference
change, Bovens (1992) proposes his alternative, according to which a preference
adjustment is rational only if it is informed by the agent’s overall preference struc-
ture, all-things-considered. For example, the fox in La Fontaine’s fable, who changes
his preference for the grapes because they are out of reach, is irrational because he
changes this particular token preference for those grapes in an ad hoc way, with-
out changing his type preference for the sweet, juicy summer fruits (a case of sour
grapes, or SG). In contrast, imagine that I lost the current postdoc position and had
to take a research administration job. Suppose I, as a result of this career choice, start
to better appreciate my life in general, by enjoying the possibility of planning my life
over a longer term (having a family, start saving, buying a house, etc.) and reading
more fiction at home, etc., and say “Oh how I love my job more than the postdoc.”
Then my preference change for the current career over the academic one is not SG
but rational, because my global preferences have also changed in such a way that this
particular preference coheres with them. In other words, now I am the kind of person
who enjoys this kind of career with more stability and more time for leisurely reading
(a case of character planning, or CP). This theory (Bovens 1992) says that a rational
choice is one that coheres with the agent’s overall, all-things-considered preferences.
Based on this theory, the objection from coherence can be stated more precisely:
nudges are morally problematic to the extent that they induce preference change that
disturbs the overall coherence of the all-things-considered preferences of the agent.
Bovens (2009) applies this criterion by first distinguishing six different types of
nudges based on their target mechanisms, and then criticizes two types which tend to
do this (see also Heilmann 2014).
1Until Section 4.2 where it becomes relevant I defer the discussion of the distinction between the
responsiveness-to-reasons view and the responsiveness-to-reasoning view, which is that the former is
strongly externalist (i.e. reasons should correspond to external reality) while the latter is weakly so (i.e.
reasoning should respect certain objective norms, but it can accommodate false beliefs) (Buss 2014).
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The first four types are acceptable because these nudges try to ‘[steer] us in the
direction of what we consider to be in line with our overall preference structure.’
(Bovens 2009, 213) For example, suppose that Jack wants to adopt a dietary regime
that is optimal for his health, all things considered. In such a situation, nudges might
change Jack’s unhealthy dietary choice due to the lack of expertise in nutritional
science (Ignorance), forgetfulness or laziness (Inertia), temptations of sweet, salty
and fatty foods (Akrasia), or emotional costs associated with thinking seriously about
what he puts into his mouth (Queasiness).2 In these cases, nudges aim to ameliorate
a particular local inconsistency so that the preference in question will be adjusted to
cohere with Jack’s overall preference for healthy dietary choice.
The other two types are more problematic because, in contrast to the first four,
these interventions nudge people ‘in the direction of agency which [they] do not
believe to be in [their] interest’ (Bovens 2009, 212), all things considered. Excep-
tions are nudges that target the statistically representative population, at the cost
of the rest. For example, the layout change in the cafeteria might nudge people to
eat more healthy food, and this might be good for most people who would regret
not having eaten healthy food after being sent for a coronary artery bypass surgery.
But such nudges might not be good for those exceptional people who, all things
considered, genuinely prefer the current unhealthy food choice plus the risk of dis-
eases and earlier death, to the current healthy food choice plus the prospect of living
healthier and longer.3 The same problem arises with many nudges that try to change
individual economic behavior (e.g., the default change of the pension scheme to
encourage saving), as long as those nudges target a population that is heterogeneous
with respect to the overall preferences. Although Thaler and Sunstein’s free choice
condition intends to prevent such exceptional individuals from getting influenced
by nudges, the condition is not generally satisfied because people with excep-
tional preferences are not always exceptionally resistant to the influence of nudges.
This is not a decisive argument against Exception nudges, but nudge paternalists
need to provide justification for prioritizing the majority preferences over those of
minorities.
Social Benefits also try to nudge people to make a choice which they do not believe
to be optimal given their individual preferences. The aim is to benefit society at large,
instead of the majority of citizens as in the case of Exceptions. Theoretically speak-
ing, Social Benefits, or what Thaler and Sunstein (2008) call social nudges (I adopt
the latter term hereafter), encourage the voluntary provision of public goods, which
are characterized by non-rivalry (one’s consumption doesn’t reduce that of others)
and non-excludability (it is impossible or difficult to exclude people from benefit-
ing from the goods). The standard economic analysis shows that voluntary provision
of public goods remains sub-optimal because self-interested individuals can do no
better than simply free-riding on others’ contributions. This is the situation called
a social dilemma. Standard policy recommendations are privatization of a good or
2These examples are mine.
3They might also have exceptional beliefs that their lives or the world will end before they start to suffer
from their dietary choice.
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taxation to finance it publicly, or to price a bad. Social nudges in contrast try to
increase (decrease) voluntary provision of public goods (bads) by other means.
Given this view of what social nudges do, the objection from coherence states
that they are problematic because if they work people will act pro-socially, which
is inconsistent with their own self-interested preferences.4 There are several ways
to respond to this objection. First we can point out that most people would endorse
the state in which public goods are sufficiently provided, given their overall inter-
ests. In a n-player (n ≥ 2) social dilemma, each player’s preference ordering is
defined roughly as DC (I defect, others cooperate)  CC (I cooperate, others coop-
erate)  DD (I defect, others defect)  CD (I cooperate, others defect). Social
nudges push an individual against her self-interest in the sense that they nudge her
to choose C though she prefers DC to CC. But at the same time, the C-choice
enables her to obtain CC, which she prefers to DD. Since DC cannot possibly
be the outcome for everyone (that is, if everyone free-rides, there will be no one
left to free-ride on), the individual would endorse CC as consistent with her over-
all interests in the sense that that’s a better outcome than DD, if achieved.5 Of
course, this endorsement will be contingent on the fact that the number of the peo-
ple nudged to the C-choice exceeds a certain threshold6 such that the payoff of the
minimal cooperative outcome is larger than that of the DD for the individual in
question.7
This response to the objection from coherence becomes even stronger when we
drop the purely conventional formulation of the social dilemma and allow that not
everyone is narrowly self-interested. Specifically, a bulk of evidence from public
goods experiments suggest that a substantial portion of subjects are conditional coop-
erators who cooperate if they expect that a sufficient number of others do the same
(for a review see Ga¨chter and Tho¨ni 2007, 188). Since these conditional cooperators
do prefer CC to DC, if social nudges create this expectation and achieve CC (or its
approximation), then there is no sense in which their C-choices do not cohere with
their overall preference structure. Regarding free-riders who complain that they were
nudged to C although they really wanted DC rather than CC, there is no practical or
ethical reason to respect such preferences, unlike in the case of Exceptions above. As
to those free-riders who were not nudged, they have nothing to complain about since
they actually became better off.
Another, perhaps more radical way to respond to the objection from coherence
is to deny that there is such a thing as the overall preference structure correspond-
ing to the all-things-considered evaluation of the individual.8 Bacharach et al. (2006,
Introduction) explicate this idea as variable frame theory. In contrast to the standard
4Bovens (2009) doesn’t state this explicitly (see footnote 8 on page 214), so this is my reconstruction.
5Here I am interpreting the social dilemma as a dilemma for individuals, as well as for social planners.
Some game theorists adopt an alternative interpretation according to which individuals do not face any
dilemma as they simply choose dominant strategies based on their preferences. On this reading a C-choice
is against their self-interest by definition, although such a view is not common in social sciences.
6This number is Schelling’s k Schelling (1978, ch.7).
7I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
8I thank an anonymous reviewer for giving me the courage to say this.
Social Nudges: Their Mechanisms and Justification 487
literature on framing that presupposes an objectively identifiable set of choices, vari-
able frame theory suggests that (i) a choice set becomes meaningful only after framed
in a certain way; (ii) different frames make different objects of choice salient; and
(iii) in effect, people choose from different sets under different frames. For instance,
(, O, X) can be ‘delta, omicron, chi’ in a Greek frame or ‘triangle, circle, cross’
in a geometry frame, but one cannot say that the agent’s choice reveals inconsistent
preferences if she chooses O in the Greek frame, while choosing X in the geometry
frame: the agent is in a way choosing from a different choice set in each case. In social
dilemma and coordination games, Bacharach et al. (2006) specify two frames that a
player may adopt, namely I-frame and we-frame. The standard game theory implic-
itly assumes that a player in social dilemmas always adopts an I-frame (asking “What
should I do?”), leading to the dominant reasoning (“whatever others do, I will be
better off defecting”). But she could be adopting, argue Bacharach et al. (2006), a we-
frame (asking “What should we do?”). Players who are in the we-frame will choose
C, an action that is part of the strategy profile that uniquely maximizes the group’s
payoff (CC). If individuals are nudged to adopt the we-frame rather than the I-frame
(or vice versa), this does not make their preference structure inconsistent because the
former follows from and is relative to framing (more on this in Section 4.2).
To sum up, there are plausible mechanisms of social nudges that are not vulnerable
to the objection from coherence. Generally speaking, social dilemmas are situations
where individual rationality leads not only to social inefficiency but individual ineffi-
ciency (i.e., CC is both individually and collectively more desirable than DD), and it
is widely recognized that some institutional interventions are legitimate (some even
believe that the legitimacy of the state depends solely on solving social dilemmas).
From this perspective social nudges are not different from other types of institutions
that solve social dilemmas. That said, social nudge paternalists still owe an answer
to the objection from autonomy since this objection concerns not only what social
nudges do, but how they do it. I now turn to this question.
4 The Objection from Autonomy
The objection from autonomy states that nudges are ethically problematic to the
extent that they change individual behavior in such a way that is not responsive to the
agent’s reasoning process. To address the objection we thus need to explicitly discuss
how social nudges affect behavior. In responding to the objection from coherence in
the last section, I briefly sketched two mechanisms of social nudges, namely (i) the
creation of the expectations that others will cooperate among conditional cooperators
(the expectation-based mechanism); and (ii) the shift from I-frame to we-frame (the
frame-based mechanism). In each case, if the proportion of optimistic conditional
cooperators or of team-reasoners becomes large enough, CC can be achieved. In this
section, I will discuss an example of successful nudges in order to evaluate the force
of the objection from autonomy in a concrete policy context, while developing this
sketch of the mechanisms of social nudges. Note that my goal here is not to offer
the empirically most plausible explanation of why this particular nudge worked, but
rather to develop my responses to the objection from autonomy.
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4.1 Social Nudges as Social Norm Engineering
In a chapter titled Following the herd, Thaler and Sunstein (2008, 60) acclaim “Don’t
Mess With Texas”, a highly successful social advertisement campaign against litter-
ing on Texas’s highways initiated by the Texas Department of Transportation. Using
a variety of media ranging from TV social advertisement featuring Texan celebri-
ties to logo T-shirts and mug cups, the campaign reduced the amount of litter in
Texas by 29 % in the first year of the campaign, and in its first six years visi-
ble roadside litter was reduced by 72 %. How has this been achieved? Thaler and
Sunstein (2008) do not provide an explanation of this specific case, but instead sug-
gest roughly two accounts of how social nudges can encourage prosocial behavior.
These are expectation-based and priming-based accounts. In what follows I recon-
struct and extend them as the explanations of the success of “Don’t MessWith Texas”
in order to facilitate the discussion of the permissibility of social nudges. I will
discuss the priming-based account in the next subsection, and here reconstruct the
expectation-based one, drawing on Bicchieri’s (2006) well-known model of social
norms.
The expectation-based account suggests that the campaign somehow created the
expectation that others will refrain from littering among the Texans who are con-
ditional followers of social norms. Bicchieri (2006) models such an individual as
having a conditional preference such that she prefers to conform to a certain behav-
ioral pattern on condition that she believes (a) that enough people are conforming
(empirical expectation) and (b) that enough people are expecting her to conform
(normative expectation). Although this model predicts that people follow a certain
social norm when both of these conceptually distinct conditions are satisfied, the two
types of expectations are causally connected. First, at the individual scale there is a
psychological mechanism which detects normative expectations from empirical ones
in certain social contexts. For example, a college student is less likely to engage in
binge drinking when informed that alcohol abuse is less pervasive among fellow stu-
dents than he thinks it is (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 67). Weakening an empirical
expectation (Others are drinking hard) can weaken a normative expectation (Others
expect me to drink hard), thereby reducing conformist behavior. Second, this mech-
anism can operate dynamically at the aggregate scale, since everyone’s behavior
affects everyone else’s by affecting one’s empirical expectation. So the first student
who stopped binge drinking may affect the next’s empirical and normative expec-
tations, thereby influencing her to stop binge drinking as well, and so on. But in
order for this social process to unfold, a certain threshold (the so-called critical mass
or tipping point, which can take a different value for different people) needs to be
reached.
Based on this reconstruction, Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) expectation-based
explanation of the success of “Don’t Mess With Texas” would be like this: the
Texas authority successfully raised the conditional norm followers’ expectations
that enough others expect them not to litter, with a “tough-talking slogan”. Indi-
viduals who have stronger conformist preferences (i.e. whose critical numbers of
“enough” others are relatively low) change behavior first, which in turn change
behavior of those with weaker conformist preferences, until eventually all conditional
Social Nudges: Their Mechanisms and Justification 489
norm-followers have changed behavior. This is exactly the opposite case of the
dissipation of undesirable norms such as binge drinking among college students.
Does the objection from autonomy carry any weight against social nudges that
exploit these mechanisms? In these cases, actions are produced through the right
kind of belief-desire psychological process, i.e., people’s conditional preference for
norm conformity is activated by satisfying two epistemic conditions, namely empir-
ical and normative expectations. In this sense social norm engineering operates
through practical reasoning, and therefore is unproblematic. One might argue that
it exploits irrationality because an empirical expectation (Enough people are not lit-
tering) does not imply, logically speaking, a normative one (Enough people expect
me to refrain from littering). Though this is generally true, note that in this spe-
cific example there is an additional assumption that littering is illegal and morally
condemned (and that this is common knowledge). With this assumption, the infer-
ence seems valid, or at least very reasonable.9 Also norm engineering to some
extent respects heterogeneous preferences since it can in principle affect all con-
ditional norm followers with different degrees of conformist preferences, through
the social mechanism described above. The recalcitrant nonconformists who can-
not be nudged have to be incentivized by conventional means such as fines and
imprisonment.
One might still object that these mechanisms operate unconsciously, and therefore
outside the realm of practical reasoning (Thaler and Sunstein (2008) seem to worry
about this feature of nudges in general). However whether an action was conscious or
unconscious is not a relevant criterion for whether that action was delivered through
practical reasoning. Although ample research suggests that most of our everyday
choices are made unconsciously, we still consider ourselves as the authors of these
choices, post hoc. What is relevant is rather whether the targeted mechanism can be,
conscious or unconscious, characterized as reasoning of our own. I thus conclude
that the objection from autonomy is not convincing enough to reconsider the use of
social nudges qua norm engineering.
4.2 Social Nudges as Framing
Another account of social nudges refers to the frame-based mechanism. Specifically,
social nudges may induce people to shift from I-frame to we-frame in social dilem-
mas, thereby increasing pro-social, group-oriented behavior. Whether and how this
frame-shift takes place has been lively discussed by researchers, some suggesting that
the increase of voluntary contributions in public goods experiments are mostly due
to the change of expectations rather than the shift in framing (e.g. Guala et al. 2013).
If this is the case, the response in the previous sub-section will suffice. But since the
empirical jury is still out, I will discuss possible mechanisms of frame-shift, and then
9Thaler and Sunstein (2008) refer to the “spot-light effect”, which makes us believe that others pay more
attention to us and our behavior than they really do when we become aware that we look or behave
differently from others. Although this effect sometimes creates false beliefs—e.g., that the audience of my
presentation scorn my shabby jacket when no one actually cares—this doesn’t seem to explain the case of
“Don’t Mess With Texas” because in a typical Texan road there aren’t many people around you.
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try to defend social nudges that exploit these mechanisms against the objection from
autonomy.
The key question, when considering autonomy as responsiveness to reasoning, is
whether a frame-shift is responsive to practical reasoning. If it isn’t, nudging peo-
ple to adopt one frame rather than another doesn’t seem to respect their autonomy.
If it is, in contrast, a frame-shift can be defended in a similar way as the shift of
expectations.
Bacharach’s (2006) view on this matter is ambivalent.10 On the one hand, his
view of framing as “an involuntary processing stage which is neither rational nor
irrational” (p. 23) suggests that he didn’t see it as part of reasoning to which the stan-
dards of rationality applies. On the other, he saw team reasoning that solves some
coordination and cooperation problems as “good game-theoretic reasoning” (ibid.).
In particular, Bacharach’s interdependence hypothesis proposes that the salience of
three features of a game makes it more likely that the players team reason, i.e.,
identify themselves as members of a team (group identification), frame the choice
situation as team members (we-framing), and play their part to achieve the team’s
goal. The first feature is the existence of common interest, defined as the fact that
players prefer outcome s* to outcome s. The second feature is co-power, the fact that
s* can be brought about only by an appropriate combination of their actions, and
the third is the existence of a Nash equilibrium that realizes s rather than s*, making
the attainment of s* unassured by their individualistic decision-making (see Smer-
illi 2012). An intuition behind these conditions, roughly put, seems to be that people
adopt a we-frame when there is good reason to do so, e.g., when it gives extra benefit
to individuals that I-frame cannot deliver. On this view the adoption of a we-frame
is responsive to justifiable reasons.11 Here I offer a two-fold response to the objec-
tion from autonomy, without resolving the ambivalent nature of Bacharach’s theory
of team reasoning. First, if the frame-choice precedes practical reasoning, nudging
people to adopt one or the other frame bypasses their practical reasoning. Second, if
the adoption of a we-frame tends to occur when it is beneficial to individuals, we can
say that the choice of the we-frame is responsive to reasons. Since Bacharach seems
to accept both conditional statements, it implies that social nudges that exploit we-
framing do respect responsiveness to reasons, but not reasoning. I did not highlight
this distinction in Section 2, but it matters which notion of autonomous agency one
adopts, if Bacharach is right in claiming that a frame choice lies outside the realm of
practical reasoning.12
10I thank an anonymous reviewer for making me realize this point clearly.
11Bacharach et al. (2006, ch.3) speculate on the evolutionary mechanism of the human propensity to adopt
a we-framing in certain coordination and cooperation problems.
12Note however that Bacharach’s view that framing is neither rational nor irrational is not widely accepted.
First of all, it seems to be in tension with his interdependence hypothesis and his model of circumspect
team reasoning that explicitly weighs the risk of others not adopting a we-frame. Another prominent team
reasoning theorist Sugden (1993) also suggests that for a player to adopt a we-frame, she needs assurance
or common reason to believe that enough others do the same. More generally, many emotion researchers
emphasize that the way we construe (or frame) a decision situation is motivated by our salient concerns,
i.e., ‘the attachments and interests from which many of our desires and aversions derive.’ Roberts (2003,
142).
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One might object to the second part of the response by saying that social nudges
often try to activate a we-frame even without making any reason salient. That is, a
shift from I-frame to we-frame might not even be responsive to reasons in the sense
specified by the interdependence hypothesis. This objection questions the reason-
relevant connection between social nudges and we-framing. In general, framing of a
choice problem can be influenced by contextual factors that bring to mind a partic-
ular set of ideas (Bacharach et al. 2006, 12). This effect is called priming. Priming
uses some words, symbols, etc., which increase the ease with which certain infor-
mation comes to mind, which in turn stimulates certain action. Thaler and Sunstein
(2008) mention certain examples. Objects characteristic of business environment
make people less cooperative and more competitive; giving cold coffee makes peo-
ple perceive others as more selfish and less sociable, compared to when given hot
coffee.
Now, I grant that these priming effects are worrisome in terms of the relevance
of reasons for action since we become less sure of why we chose the way we did
as the intentional tie between the cue and the resulting action becomes weaker.
(Does a warm cup of coffee give us a reason to think that someone is a warm per-
son?) Although we can often rationalize our judgement and choice by giving some
ad hoc intentional description under which it is based on some reason, this move
tends to inflate the realm of reasons without a principled theoretical motivation
(Bovens 1992).
This worry is highlighted in Hausman and Welch’s (2010) account of how “Don’t
Mess With Texas” worked as a social nudge:
[The campaign] attempted to create a machismo image for those who don’t
litter [...] and to influence behavior via that association. [...] By playing on
emotions that ought to be irrelevant to littering, it attempted some very mild
shaping and thereby influenced behavior at a much lower cost than harsher
penalties for littering or expanded enforcement of anti-littering laws. (p. 134)
I shall first comment on this specific account, before coming back to a more gen-
eral issue of the relevance of reasons for framing. Hausman and Welch’s assumption
that the positive emotions associated with a machismo image ‘ought to be irrelevant
to littering’ leaves unexplained why that particular irrelevant image did get success-
fully associated with anti-littering. Moreover, they neglect one important aspect of
the case, which is also left unexplained by Thaler and Sunstein’s account. Thaler and
Sunstein (2008, 60) cite (from an unspecified source) that the public officials of Texas
decided they needed “a tough-talking slogan that would also address the unique spirit
of Texas pride”. The Texas pride naturally has a relevant connection with littering in
the highways because it pollutes the state that Texans are proud of. The machismo
image itself may be irrelevant to littering,13 but to the extent that the former is asso-
ciated with the pride of being a Texan, it has a relevant association with pro-social,
group-oriented behavior such as non-littering.
13Except for the semantic association between the slogan (“mess with Texas”) and littering (“mess up
Texas”).
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At this stage one might say that priming always makes some pro tanto reason
salient at the expense of others, and that therefore even if it is relevant, this does
not justify letting that particular reason determine final choice. But this objection
seems to presuppose that there must be the relevant, all-things-considered, choice-
determining reason, which is like Bovens’s overall coherent preference structure the
existence of which I questioned based on variable frame theory in Section 3. Of
course the questionable theoretical or empirical status of such a reason doesn’t entitle
nudgers to prime any reason at whim. In particular, there are cases in which the use
of priming seems questionable. For example, in the classic “framing effect” (Tver-
sky and Kahneman 1986), (i) an extensionally identical choice set is described in
two different ways, priming loss or gain; (ii) loss and gain frames elicit different rea-
sons, in particular loss aversion in the loss frame; (iii) in effect, the decision maker
may reverse preferences under two descriptions, although she should be choosing
the same way because she faces extensionally the same choice set (the violation of
descriptive invariance). Since the decision maker susceptible to this framing effect
can systematically lose her resources, we can say that she has no good overall rea-
son to get primed to shift from one frame to the other, even if loss aversion is a kind
of reason pro tanto. So the use of this kind of framing effect for nudging purposes,
though popular in practice, can be questionable.
However, the same criticism doesn’t apply to social nudges that prime we-framing.
For example, think of priming by game labels: a public goods experiment can be
labeled either as the Cooperation Game or the Wall Street Game to increase or
decrease the level of contributions, respectively, relative to the control condition. The
two treatments do not change the payoff structure of the game, and yet influence the
subjects’ choices. Unlike in the classical framing effect, though, one would not say
that subjects who shift frames violate descriptive invariance and therefore are irra-
tional. Descriptive invariance has a normative force when its violation tends to make
decision-makers systematically lose, as in the framing effect in the lottery choice.
But in coordination and cooperation games like this, being primed by game labels
in fact tends to improve one’s payoff, since other players tend to be primed in the
same way. In the Wall Street Game, there are less contributions from others, so the
D-choice gives the DD-like outcome, which is preferred to CD. While in the Cooper-
ation Game, there are more contributions, so the C-choice gives the CC-like outcome,
which conditional cooperators preferred to DC, and which free-riders prefer to DD.
Systematically responding to priming in this way seems to be part of good game-
theoretic reasoning in the sense that it tends to bring in better payoffs to players,
given how other players respond to the priming.
Let us come back to “Don’t Mess With Texas” to take stock of my responses to the
objection from autonomy. First, there are at least two distinct mechanistic accounts
of this campaign’s success. One is that it increased the expectations of the conditional
norm followers that enough others will not litter and that enough others expect them
not to litter, using “the tough-talking slogan” and other means. I argued that this social
nudge is permissible primarily because the mechanism does not damage autonomous
agency in the sense of the capacity to reason. Another account is that the campaign
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primed “the unique spirit of Texas pride”, which nudged some Texans to adopt a
we-frame, in which littering was seen as “the problem of we Texans”, and those
Texans played their part to solve this problem by incurring individual costs of keeping
litter in their cars. I argued that priming a we-frame in this context is permissible if
autonomous agency is interpreted as the capacity to respond to non-arbitrary reasons,
although it may be problematic if (a) autonomy is interpreted as the responsiveness to
reasoning, and (b) framing is a neither rational nor irrational process that takes place
prior to reasoning.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that social nudgers can deal with the objections from
coherence and autonomy, with necessary qualifications. Specifically, I showed that
conditional cooperators or even free-riders may endorse their nudged pro-social
behavior given their overall preference, and that there is a way in which social nudges
encourage pro-social behavior by priming good reasons. My arguments draw on two
mechanistic explanations of how social nudges work, one based on expectations and
the other on frames. Also, I emphasized that these mechanisms take place at both
individual-psychological and collective-social scales. I hope these explanations will
complement the literature’s rather narrow focus on individual cognitive mechanisms
of nudges. As a concrete example of social nudges, I picked up the “Don’t Mess
With Texas” campaign and discussed in some detail how it worked. Of course the
campaign in reality is not a single intervention but a bundle of different strategies
with elements of both nudges and more traditional regulations. So my claim is not
that these two accounts exhaust all possible mechanisms. Also given the heterogene-
ity of the Texan population and of contexts in which they made choices, multiple
psychological and social mechanisms must have been at work. Rather, my point
was to sketch, by way of discussing this salient example, a theoretically and empiri-
cally motivated way of defending the use of social nudges in general against the two
serious moral objections to nudge paternalism.
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